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THE RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC VERSUS
THE RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN OWNERS TO
THE USE OF THE SHORE BETWEEN THE
WATERS EDGE AND THE HIGH WATER
MARK ON LAKE MURRAY
I. INTRODUCTION
Lake Murray is a large man-made navigable lake located for
the most part in Lexington County and was constructed in the
late 1920's by damming the Saluda River for the purpose of
producing electrical power by the use of a hydro-electric plant.
The lake was constructed by the Lexington Water Power Com-
pany which was the predecessor of the South Carolina Electric
and Gas Company. The high water mark of the lake is the 360
foot elevation. However, it is seldom that the water level ever
reaches this mark and normally it ranges between the 355 and
357 foot elevations, sometimes falling to even lower levels.1
Consequently, there is normally a stretch of beach or shore be-
tween the water's edge and the high water mark at the 360 foot
elevation. The question to be studied in this report is whether
the riparian land owner has the right to exclude members of
the public from entering on this strip of land in front of his
lakefront property or whether the public also has the right to
enter thereon.
In view of the fact that title to the shore may be of impor-
tance in determining the rights of the public versus the rights
of riparian owners, the preliminary question should be con-
sidered as to who holds title to the beds and banks of inland
navigable waters in South Carolina. The common law of Eng-
land recognized that title to the beds and banks of navigable
waters was in the crown but that only tidal waters were con-
sidered technically "navigable" for purposes of ownership.2
Therefore, the beds and banks of all inland waters in England
were privately owned by riparian land owners.3 The South
Carolina case of iState ex. rel. The Columbia Bridge Company
v. The City of Coumbia4 approved the English view that title
1. Interview with Robert Cassals, Director of Land and Public Facilities
for the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, in Columbia, South Caro-
lina, April 5, 1969.
2. R. E. CLARK, 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 267, 268 (1967).
3. Id. at 268.
4. 27 S.C. 137, 3 S.E. 55 (1887).
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to the beds of inland waters was not in the state but was held
in private ownership by riparian land owners. The court re-
ferred to an earlier South Carolina decision in the case of
MXCullough v. "Wall5 which had adopted the English rule that
the title to the beds and banks of nontidal waters is held in
private ownership although the public has a right of passage or
easement over the water where the stream is in fact navigable
for boats and rafts. Thus, while South Carolina recognizes
private ownership of the beds and banks of non-tidal streams,
it also recognizes the right of the public to travel over inland
waters which are navigable in fact. The following quotation
from State er. rel. The South Columbia Bridge Company v. The
City of Columbi clearly states the South Carolina position:
"[i]t is true that this proprietary right to the center of such
streams is subject to the right of the public to use such streams
for transportation as a highway, where such streams are in
fact, though [are] not technically navigable ...... Since there
is no ebb and flow of the tide in Lake Murray, the beds a~nld
banks of the lake are not owned by the State of South Carolina.
Actually the title to the great bulk of land covered by Lake
Murray is held by the South Carolina Electric and Gas Com-
pany. Upon construction of the lake, the Lexington Water
Power Company, predecessor of the South Carolina Electric
and Gas Company, purchased most of the land that was to be
covered by the lake. In some instances the land was purchased
up to the 360 foot high water mark, and in some other cases the
land was purchased up to the 365 foot elevation. The 365 foot
elevation marks the project boundary line, and the land between
the 360 and 365 foot elevation is known as fringe land. At
various times since 1955 the South Carolina Electric and Gas
Company, under the supervision of the Federal Power Com-
mission, has sold some of the fringe land to the riparian owners.
At some places on the lake portions of the lake bed are owned by
riparian owners. In these instances the South Carolina Electric
and Gas Company merely has flowage rights over the land up
to the 360 or 365 foot elevations. Thus, the fact is that some
property owners on Lake Murray only own the land down to
the 365 foot elevation while others won down to the 360 foot
5. 4 Rich. 68 (1850).
6. 27 S.C. 137, 146, 3 S.E. 55, 58 (1887).
[Vol. 23
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high water mark and still others own land out into the bed of
the lake.
7
IT. AmicpAcBI CAsE LAw
There is no law in South Carolina and very little in other
jurisdictions on the question of whether a riparian owner has
the right to the exclusive use of land in front of his property
between the high water mark and the water's edge. In fact the
only treatment given by Corpus Juris ,Secundum on this point
in regards to inland navigable lakes is as follows:
Members of the public have no right to enter and travel
on that portion of the shore on an inland navigable
lake between the ordinary high-water and low-water
marks, whether it is owned by the riparian owner or
the state, and the riparian owners may maintain an
action of trespass for such injury."
A conclusion as to whether or not this is an accurate statement
of the general law on the subject will be reserved for discussion
later in this article.
There are a few relevant cases in other jurisdictions which
may help us draw a conclusion as to what the law ought to be
in South Carolina, particularly as it would relate to Lake Mur-
ray. The case of Diana Shooting Club v. Hustling9 is repre-
sentative of the generally accepted position that the public has
the right to enter upon navigable bodies of water.10 In this case,
the plaintiff owned a tract of land which had a navigable
stream passing through it, and he held title to the bed of the
stream. The defendant paddled up the stream in a boat and
over the stream bed owned by the plaintiff. While in the boat
and floating on the navigable stream, he hunted -waterfowl
which resulted in the plaintiff bringing a trespass action
against him. The court held that the defendant was not guilty
of any trespass. Under the common law, the rights of hunting
and fishing are incident to the right of navigation which the
public has in navigable waters. In regard to the right of
7. Interview with Robert Cassals, Director of Land and Public Facilities
for the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, in Columbia, South Caro-
lina, April 5, 1969.
8. 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 60 (1966).
9. 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).
10. 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 55 (1966). See also R. E. CLARi, 1
WATEs AND WATER RIGHTS 200 (1967).
1971]
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navigation and its incidents, it is immaterial whether the title
to the stream bed is held by the state or the riparian owners.
The defendant in this case was hunting while in a boat on a
navigable stream; therefore, he had committed no trespass. The
court specifically noted that it was not deciding whether the
public had the right to hunt on a navigable stream, between
ordinary high water marks, which, because of a low stage of
water, was unnavigable, or on land between such marks which
had become dry or exposed.
The case of Stewart v. Turney11 dealt specifically with the
right to exclude the public from land lying between the waters
edge and the high water mark. In that case the plaintiff had
leased a tract of land from a riparian owner along the shore
of Caguya Lake, and inland navigable lake in the State of New
York. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prohibit the de-
fendant from hunting on land between the high and low water
marks along the lake in front of the leased property. The case
turned on the question of whether the plaintiff's lessor had title
to the land above the low water mark. The court held that the
plaintiff's lessor did have title to the shore down to the low
water mark and granted the injunction. The property in ques-
tion was in private ownership, and the plaintiff could prohibit
the defendant from entering on the land above the waters edge.
A more recent New York decision, People v. Kraemer," fol-
lows the spirit of the Stewart case, although the factual situa-
tion is different and does not involve an inland navigable lake.
In Kraemer there was a prosecution for the violation of a town
trespass statute. The alleged trespass occurred in the village of
Lloyd Harbor which borders on Lloyd Point Basin, a navigable
man made harbor, located just off Long Island Sound. The
information charged each of several defendants with anchoring
their vessels upon private property in the harbor, and it charged
one defendant with entering upon the shore of the harbor on
land below the high water mark. Although the defense asserted
that the land upon which the alleged trespasses occurred was
owned by the State of New York, the court found that the bed
of the harbor and the shores were privately owned. The defense
also asserted that, even though the land in question may have
been privately owned, the waters over the land were navigable
waters and, therefore, were subject to the public right of navi-
11. 237 N.Y. 117, 142 N.E. 437, 31 A.L.R. 90 (1923).
12. 7 Misc. 2d 273, 164 N.Y.S. 2d 423 (1957).
(Vol. 23
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gation which included both the right to anchor and to enter
upon the shore. Since the harbor was navigable the court found
that the defendants as members of the public had the right to
navigate therein. In holding that the public had a right of
navigation, the court concluded that the public also had the
incidents necessary to enjoyment of that right, one of these
incidents being the right of temporary anchorage. Thus, the
court found the defendants not guilty on the trespass charge of
dropping anchor in Lloyd Point Basin. However, the court did
find one of the defendants guilty of trespass in entering upon
the shore of the harbor below the high water mark. The court
stated: "the public right of navigation does not include the
right to enter upon the foreshore when it is in private owner-
ship, except where and to the extent necessary in the exercise
of the right of navigation. The defendant ... does not contend
that an emergency arose while he was in the harbor, that re-
quired him to go ashore."' 3 The Kraemer case follows the gen-
eral rule that navigators have no right to use the foreshore or
bank of a navigable stream which are in private ownership
except where a temporary use is made of the bank or shore in
case of peril or emergency, or where the right has been obtained
by agreement, grant, or prescription. 14 In the light of the fore-
going cases, it would appear that the public does not have the
right to enter upon the foreshore below the high water mark
when that strip of land is privately owned.
The cases thus far discussed have dealt with the situation in
which the beds or shores of navigable bodies of water have been
held in private ownership. The next line of cases to be discussed
deal with right to the use of the shore where the bed of the
navigable water is held in state or public ownership. Anderson
v. Reames15 is a very interesting case although it presents a
somewhat complicated factual situation. The plaintiffs in this
case operated a commercial fishing camp along the shores of
Grand Mere Lake, a navigable inland lake in the State of
Arkansas. The entire bed of this lake is owned by the state.
The defendants, as lessees, occupied property bordering on the
lake, the boundary of which extended only to the high water
mark. The plaintiff's camp facilities were located partially on
the surface of the lake and partially along the shore between
the high and low water marks in front of the property leased
13. Id. at 434.
14. 65 C.J.S. Nazigable Waters § 25 (1966).
15. 204 Ark. 216, 161 S.W.2d 957 (1942).
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to the defendants. The plaintiffs brought an action to restrain
the defendants from enclosing the shore with a fence along the
waters edge in front of the leased property. The defendants
brought a cross-action to have the plaintiff's facilities removed
from their location both on the shore and on the surface of the
lake. On appeal, a decree of the lower court was affirmed
which, among other things, required the defendant to remove
the fence along the shore line. The decree also directed the
plaintiff to remove their facilities from the shore and pre-
vented them from receiving or discharging customers along the
shore in front of the property in question. The decree did up-
hold the plaintiffs' right to continue their operation on the sur-
face of the lake. The fact that the decree required the plaintiff
to remove his facilities from the shore would seem to indicate
that the defendants had the right to control the use of the
shore bordering on the lake. However, the court went on to
discuss the rights of the public generally in the use of the
shore. The court concluded that the rights of the riparian own-
ers along the lake front did not permit them to interfere with
the right of the public generally in the use of the shore or beach
between the high water mark and the waters edge for the pur-
pose of bathing, hunting, fishing, and the landing of boats, so
long as such use did not unreasonably interfere with the ripar-
ian's right of ingress or egress. Thus, the dicta of this case gives
the public substantial rights in regard to the use of the shore
and effectively negates the conclusion that the riparian owner
has any right to the exclusive use of the land between the waters
edge and the high water mark.
The case of Evans v. Duga involved a factual situation
similar to that in the Anderson case. In this case the plaintiff
owned a tract of land bordering on Lake Bistineau in the State
of Louisiana. The defendant operated a commercial fishing
camp on the shore in front of the plaintiff's property and had
erected some buildings between the waters edge and the high
water mark. The plaintiff brought an action to compel the
defendant to remove the buildings from the shore and to pro-
hibit him from operating the fishing camp in front of the
plaintiff's lake front property. The plaintiff did not contend
that the camp interferred with his free use of the shore but
alleged that the existence of the camp made it impossible for
him to sell lake front lots along the lake where the camp was
16. 205 La. 398, 17 So. 2d 562 (1944).
[Vol.M
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located. Apparently the plaintiff proceeded on the theory that
the camp constituted a public nuisance. The court found that
the bed of the lake, an inland navigable lake, was owned by the
state between the high water marks. Lake Bistineau by act of
the legislature had been declared a state game and fish preserve.
The Lake Bistineau State Game and Fish Commission had been
created to manage this property, and the defendant had ob-
tained permission from the Commission to establish a commer-
cial fishing camp on the shores of the lake. It was concluded
that the defendant had the right to operate the fishing camp on
the land between the waters edge and the high water mark and
that the camp was in fact a public convenience. Specifically,
the court held that the plaintiff, as a riparian owner, had no
right to appropriate to his exclusive use the shore of Lake
Bistineau lying on front of his property, nor did he have any
private property right in the use of the land in question which
was public and under the control of authorized state agencies.
The court noted that the plaintiff was not deprived of his rights
as to fishing, boating, landing, or traveling along the shore.
The cases thus far reviewed seem to indicate that the right
of the public and the riparian owner to the use of the shore
turns on the issue of who has title to the strip of land between
the waters edge and the high water mark. The case of Doemel
V. JantZ17 was the only case discovered in researching this arti-
cle in which the rights to the use of the shore were determined
without deciding who held title to the shore. In that case the
plaintiff owned a tract bordering on Lake Winnebogo, an
inland navigable lake in the State of Wisconsin. The defendant
entered upon the shore in front of the plaintiff's lot which was
being used as a pasture, and the plaintiff brought an action for
trespass. The lower court upheld the plaintiff's demurrer to
the defendant's answer and the defendant appealed. The ques-
tion to be decided on appeal was whether a member of the
general public could legally enter upon and use for purpose of
public travel that strip of land which lay between the ordinary
high and low water mark. The plaintiff contended that he
owned the property down to the low water mark and thus could
prohibit the public from entering upon the land. In the alter-
native, the plaintiff contended that, even if he held title only
down to the high water mark, that by reason of being a riparian
owner he had the exclusive right to use the shore in front of his
17. 180 Wis. 225, 193 N.W. 393, 31 A.L.R. 90 (1923).
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property between the ordinary high and low water marks. The
court recognized that the rights of the public in navigable
waters was confined to the right of navigation, but that the
term "navigation" has been employed to include the use of
waters for purposes of travel, fishing, bathing, recreation, and
hunting. However, the court indicated that the right to naviga-
tion existed only upon the actual body of water and not upon
the shore. It was noted that the Diana iShooting Club case
affirmed the right of the public to hunt game up to the high
water mark of a navigable stream while the water of the stream
actually extended to that high water mark. The court concluded
that, when the strip of land between the high and low water
marks was covered by water, the public had the right of naviga-
tion over the land, but that, when the water receded, this right
was succeeded by the exclusive right of the riparian owner. The
exclusive use of the shore was found to be a riparian right, and
the court found it unnecessary to decide whether or not the
plaintiff held title to the shores. The plaintiff's demurrer to
the answer was sustained. This case was cited as authority for
the proposition of general law appearing in Corpus Junrs
cundum8s which was quoted in full earlier in this article.
The decision in this case was analyzed and criticized in a 1958
Wisconsin Law Review article.19 The writer of that article is
of the opinion that the holding of the case merely assumes that
the defendant invaded a riparian right and that there was no
justification given for this assumption. While the reasoning
in the decision isn't crystal clear, this writer believes the case
may be justified if the decision is viewed not as an expansion
of riparian rights but as a limitation upon the public to use
only the navigable water and not the dry land bordering upon
the navigable body of water.
In any event, the Wisconsin article concluded that the decision
was probably influenced by the plaintiff's policy argument
which portrayed a bleak future of idlers, hunters, and ill-
mannered loafers carousing and annoying many lakeshore farm-
ers if the public was allowed to travel freely along the shore.20
18. Supra note 8.
19. Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters,
1958 Wis. L. REv. 335.
20. Id. at 372, 373.
[Vol..W1,
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III. CONGLWSION
In applying legal principles to the question of whether or not
riparian owners have the right to the exclusive use of the shores
on Lake Murray, only the rights of those property owners will
be discussed who own property down to the 360 foot high water
mark or who own property out into the bed of the lake. As
previously mentioned, some property owners have title only
down to the 365 foot level along the project boundary line.
However, there are many legal questions involved in regard to
their rights to the use of the shore including the basic issue of
whether they are even riparian owners. These questions are not
within the scope of this report and will not be discussed herein.
As to property owners along the lake whose property extends
into the bed of the lake, it would seem that they have a strong
case for claiming the exclusive right to use the shore between
the waters edge and the high water mark. As we have seen in
other jurisdictions, the case law seems to indicate that the
riparian does have the right to the exclusive use of the shore in
these cases. Of course, if the issue arose in South Carolina in
regard to Lake Murray or any lake, it would be a question of
novel impression, and our court would not be bound by the cas6
law in other states. It could be argued on behalf of the public
that Lake Murray is an important recreation area for the gen-
eral public and that the modern approach is to consider the
public right of navigation in navigable waters to include the
rights of fishing, hunting, boating, and recreational enjoyment
in general. Although the South Carolina courts have not been
called upon to define navigation in such broad terms, there is
no logical reason for refusing to do so. Assuming the courts
would accept this modern definition, it could be argued that in
order to exercise this broadened right of navigation, it is neces-
sary that the public be given the right to enter upon private
shores. Corpus Juris states that "[flishing implies a reasonable
use of the water and shore line of a navigable stream."21 Like-
wise, it is only logical that boating and recreational enjoyment
of the lake should imply a reasonable use of the shore line. It
goes without saying that it would be difficult indeed to enjoy
a pleasant day of recreation on the lake without being able to
enter upon the shore. The right of the public to use the lake
should necessarily grant to the public the right to the reasonable
21. 26 C. J. Fish § 17 (1921).
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use of the shore between the waters edge and the high water
mark.
The riparian owner could counter this argument with his own
argument that to allow the public to enter upon the shore in
front of his property would intrude on his right of privacy.
In addition, there are a large number of commercial recrea-
tional facilities all along the shores of Lake Murray including
boat landings and campgrounds which have complete recrea-
tional facilities, including even picnic tables. Also, there are
several areas on the lake which have been developed by the
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company for the recreational
use of the public. Therefore, there is no need to allow the public
to use private property in pursuit of fun and frolic, especially
considering the fact that the public may freely engage in these
activities on the surface of the lake. In view of both policy
arguments and the relevant American case law, the law should
be that property owners on Lake Murray who own property out
into the bed of the lake have the right to exclude the public
from entering upon the shore below the high water mark.
The rights of the public versus the rights of the riparians to
the use of the shore is a more difficult controversy where the
riparian owner holds title only down to the 360 foot level. As
previously noted, the bed of Lake Murray up to the high water
mark at the 360 foot level and adjacent to these property own-
ers is owned by the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company
and not by the State of South Carolina. Nevertheless, for the
purpose of determining the rights of the public and the ripar-
ians in regard to the shore below the high water mark, it would
seem logical for the South Carolina courts to consider the issue
as though the title to the bed of the lake were held by the state
in trust for public use. This would be an appropriate way to
analyze the issue in view of the fact that the policy of the South
Carolina Electric and Gas Company is to allow the public to
use, for purposes or recreation, the land owned by the company
along the shores of the lake.2
2
Assuming that the courts would analyze the problem as
though the bed of the lake were owned by the state, the case law
of other jurisdictions does not reveal any uniform principle of
law to be applied. Some of the cases reviewed in this article
22. Interview with Robert Cassals, Director of Land and Public Facilities
for the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, in Columbia, South Caro-
lina, April 5, 1969.
Vol. 2
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used strong language in support of the public right to enter
upon the shore where title to that strip of land was held in
public ownership. However, the holding in the Jantz case
stands for the position that the riparian owner may exclude the
public from entering upon the shore regardless of whether or
not the riparian holds title to the shore. Consequently, policy
arguments will be important factors in determining the out-
come of the controversy. Basically the same policy arguments
as previously mentionad would also be applicable in this case.
In the opinion of this writer, the argument on behalf of the
riparian owner is the stronger argument. This is particularly
true in regard to Lake Murray because of the ample recrea-
tional facilities currently available to the public. As a practical
matter, there are many miles of shore line on Lake Murray
which have not been developed, and the public could in most
cases enter upon the shore in these areas without objection from
riparian owners. There appears to be no real need to give the
public the right to enter upon the shore over the objection of a
riparian owner. Considering the American case law and bal-
ancing it with the policy arguments and the factual circum-
stances in regard to the problem on Lake Murray, it is this
writer's opinion that the riparian owner should have the right
to exclude the public from entering upon the shore.
In conclusion, the riparian owners along the shores of Lake
Murray, including those who hold title to land down to the
360 foot high water mark and those who hold title to land out
in the bed of the lake, should have the exclusive right to use
and to exclude the public from entering upon the shore between
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